When we heard the news of Spranger's death, we knew that here had gone from us not only a great human being, but with him a whole world, a world which he still represented and which no longer exists for us. When we try to realize what has happened, try to assess what we have lost in him, it is not only the man whom we mourn. He was a man of firmly upright carriage and aristocratic bearing, of reserved and almost shyly concealed goodness of heart, whose deep resignation had matured in his old age into the calm of supreme wisdom, a man whom we could only approach with abashed reverence, not daring to let him perceive the whole extent of our devotion lest we overstep the bounds of propriety. Now it is too late and to us remains the pain of remembering what we left unsaid.

The many examples of his human relationships which Wenke collected on the occasion of Spranger's 75th birthday present an illuminating and moving picture of his personality. Now that nothing is left to us but our memories, these examples are doubly valuable.

With Spranger a whole world has gone from us. He was the last human being for whom Goethe was still a living presence. I am not referring to an external co-existence, for half a Century had passed between Goethe's death and Spranger's birth. But Spranger still lived on in the unbroken tradition established by Goethe. That was why it was possible for him in his numerous lectures and articles to turn back to Goethe as the most appropriate recipient of his thoughts. And that is why his articles on Goethe, especially those on Goethe in his later years, often read like a discreet soliloquy.

In general his was the world of German classicism and German idealism, the world of the great German cultural tradition. Spranger had grown up in the period before the first World War and it was in that period that his personality was formed. He felt at home in it, and that was why he was still entirely representative of that world.

And yet it was not until after the first World War, when he became professor at the University of Berlin, that his influence really began to make itself felt: that was the period which is usually, but inadequately, called the period of the Weimar Republic. He threw his whole energy into the reconstruction of the educational and cultural Systems. He was openly in favour of all the modern tendencies of that time. We find evidence of this in his early interest in national economy and sociology, in his connection with the rapidly developing youth movement, his sympathy with the tempestuous pedagogic movements of his time. Almost at once he became seriously interested in the upsurge of the campaigns for women's rights, infant education, and similar problems of the day. He was consistently helpful to the Pestalozzi-Froebel Association as (so to speak) its paternal friend. In a similar spirit he recognized almost from the first, the need of the universities for rejuvenation and did his utmost to extend the scope of their activities. Thus he helped to create greater opportunities for talented students, and showed understanding for the efforts made to promote physical training.

Open minded as he thus was towards all modern trends, Spranger was no revolutionary; on
the contrary, he was of a profoundly conservative nature. He was a man of tradition, firmly rooted in German classicism. That is why the term "paternal friend" suited him so perfectly, even at a time when he was comparatively young. Such support as he gave did not take the form of direct participation, but rather that of a receptive understanding - in the profound sense that he himself attached to the word "understand"; in his interpretation it meant comprehending and laying bare the very essence of the meaning of any experience which till then had remained hidden from its own subject. In every situation he was the clarifying factor, absorbing with understanding all that was new and in the act of absorption removing its obscurities, intellectualizing its content and weaving it into the great tradition. And thus arose the significant title of his early article, "Die Jugendbewegung und – Goethe" ("The Youth Movement and – Goethe").

It would be a mistake however to belittle the other facet of the tradition represented by Eduard Spranger — namely: Berlin. It has almost the effect of a testament that the last great University address he gave here on this very platform only a few years ago should have been dedicated to the 150th anniversary of the foundation of his own — Berlin — University. His humanism was developed on the soil of Mark Brandenburg. Hence was derived the clear translucent air of the implacable clarity of his intelligence, the strict almost compulsive form of his rationality, the sobriety of his style which rejected any sentimentality and would rather take refuge in a Berlin colloquialism than use a single pompous-sounding word. Despite his deep attachment to Goethe, his idealism retains a peculiar Kantian, and transcending that, even a Prussian note. His are the ethics of unconditional self-denial and devotion to duty, of the maxi. "You can because you should." Even the firmness of his conception of values, which he opposed to all psychological and historical relativity, has its ethical root in this.

The sentence with which Spranger, already in his old age, begins the article on idealism dedicated to Albert Schweitzer (who was still older) on the latter's 85th birthday is deeply significant: The root of idealism (he writes) is the conception "nevertheless." Spranger's existence was wrapped up in the ethics of the word "nevertheless" ("dennoch"). He was a man of discipline. When we remember what a vast volume of work was produced by that always frail body, it is no disparagement of a great man to say that nothing flowed from him as it were spontaneously and easily, from a superabundant natural source; everything was acquired by him - one might almost say: forced out of himself — by severe discipline. And that is why everything he produced was shaped and finished to the last detail.

And here we should mention the other great model figure to whom he felt indebted throughout his life, namely Frederick the Great. In the bitter years of the second World War, Spranger paid tribute to him in his essay on the "Philosoph of Sanssouci" as a silent protest against the desecration of the Prussian tradition during the national-socialist regime. This Prussian tradition - as an attitude of mind, not as a power-State — belongs to the world which was very much alive in Spranger and has now ceased to exist.

It was this great tradition of humanism and ethical behaviour that Spranger again represented, loved and admired at Tübingen University after the end of the second World War and through all the calamities that grew out of it after 1946; and it was the same tradition that had become a symbol for a generation of students which, according to Spranger's own testimony was "the finest and most serious-minded of all he had known" in the course of his many years of teaching. In those difficult years Spranger felt that the responsibility of University teachers reached out far beyond the sciences and he began to address grave warnings to a much wider public. Even as far back as 1918 he had repeatedly pointed out that the German cultured classes were
sadly lacking in a sense of responsibility and had attempted to counteract this by strengthening their political education. In the catastrophic conditions which followed the year 1933 he saw the consequences of this fatal neglect. Spranger's cultural philosophy increasingly developed into cultural pathology, i.e., into an investigation into the Symptoms of sickness in our culture. With deep anxiety he would put the question as phrased in the title of one of his lectures: "Is it still Possible to Redeem the Modern Cultural Process?" The only possible way to avoid the path leading to mechanization and barbarism was in his view to be found in the ethical forces within the individual human being, whose conscience would cause him to feel responsible for the whole. He was tireless in his demands for the creation of a new cultural responsibility and for a new educational System based thereon. He never ceased to issue warnings, although he often realized sorrowfully how very little effect they were having.

Spranger led a very full life, as full as it is possible for the life of a scholar to be. His enthusiastic students eagerly filled any auditorium in which he gave his lectures. The bibliography of his works up to 1958 comprises 777 titles and would have to be considerably enlarged if brought up to date. His books have been translated into most European and many non-European languages. His was a powerful influence on innumerable Councils, and over and over again he would take part in discussions on practical matters relating to schools — work which diverted him from his own academic studies. His influence stretched from South America [226/227] to East Asia. All honours and awards that may be accorded to a scholar were showered on him.

This is not the place to describe his work as a whole. It must suffice to mention a few features which clarify his position in the world of scholarship and his influence on our teaching.

The beginning of Spranger's intellectual development is marked by his two books on Wilhelm von Humboldt, namely: his basic work on "Wilhelm von Humboldt und die Humanitätsidee" (1909), ("Wilhelm von Humboldt and the Conception of Humanity"), and the other, the book which is as it were a by-product of the first: "Wilhelm von Humboldt und die Reform des Bildungswesens" (1910), ("Wilhelm von Humboldt and the Reform of the Education System"). These first-fruits constitute a kind of anticipatory symbol and confession of faith; for Humboldt's nature is so profoundly bound up with his own that the very choice of subject indicates his own intellectual character and his place in the intellectual world. One could quite appropriately designate Spranger as the Humboldt of our age.

Just as Wilhelm von Humboldt's personality cannot be fully envisaged by means of descriptions broken up into the usual categories, because it is not completely expressed in poetry or in philosophy or by his political efforts, so it is with Spranger. True, he was certainly an eminent educationalist and a no less eminent philosopher, and he also had a lasting influence on the practical development of the schools System. And yet it would not be fair to him to compare him with other philosophers or educationalists. For that would give only a partial image. Even though he took Humboldt as the basis of his cultural conceptions, and even though he was continually turning back to Goethe and found comfort in his communion with the "Philosopher of Sanssouci", Spranger in the supremacy of his freedom was always something more than appears in any single piece of work; beyond the limitations of the formal disciplines he was first of all a humanist, the representative of pure humanity, the bearer of a rich
and matured conception of culture. If was Humboldt's combination of individuality and universality forming an integral human total, which was reborn in Spranger's person.

There was yet another trait which significantly connected him with Humboldt. That was the common ground of the historical venue of this humanism, the two poles of which have already been mentioned above, namely Weimar and Berlin, representing on the one hand German classicism in its whole human maturity and the Prussian world of naked clarity and stern discipline on the other. And hence came too the feeling of responsibility towards the tasks of public life, and - in Spranger's case in particular — towards work in connection with schools organization.

And finally a third factor which must not be entirely overlooked, although it is less apparent in his literary works, and that is that both these men pursued their activities in times that were critical for the life of the State, in eras of political collapse and of the re-construction that began thereafter. However firmly Spranger's work is rooted in the still peaceful world before 1914, it was the Situation which arose after 1918, the tense concentration and the passionate will to organize a fresh start, which was the direct catalyst releasing his pedagogic energies.

In a profound sense all this characterizes his historical position in the intellectual world. Still based on the great unbroken tradition of German classicism and German idealism which had made its firm impression on the whole of his humanity, he yet worked in a new world which had survived collapse, steeped himself in its problems and attempted to anchor in it anew the everlasting values of tradition. And so we get this double view of him: while preserving the wisdom of tradition he yet grappled firmly with the demands of the modern world, renewing the power of that which is everlasting in meeting the needs of the hour.

But with these last remarks we have indicated the point at which Spranger differs decisively from Humboldt: while Humboldt's nature was directed entirely to his own self-development, Spranger did not find in him the ethic-social responsibility which in his own case forms the basis of his capacity as teacher.

Spranger's world renown rests on two great books: the "Lebensformen" which after a first draft dated 1914 was published in its final form in 1921, and the "Psychologie des Jugendalters", 1924. These two books, together with some greater or lesser monographs, indicate the first great phase of his creative work.

Both these books lay the foundations of his own psychology of the humane sciences; for this psychology, as it grew to tremendous proportions in the twenties, was the work of Spranger. The basic beginnings and the rich plenitude of conceptions which Dilthey had already developed in the eighties of the previous Century in his "Ideen zu einer beschreibenden und zergliedernden Psychologie" ("Ideas for a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology"), assumed in Spranger's clarifying, systematizing, and possibly even simplifying spirit, the form in which they so to speak became teachable and suitable for supplying a whole generation of teachers with the intellectual armour necessary for their cultural task.

Spranger's double debt to Dilthey and von Paulsen does not indicate indecision or doubt, but is deeply anchored in his personality. In a way it reflects the polarity of Prussianism and Classicism. Where Dilthey's conceptions pressed forward into new territory, in many shapes and often so entangled that they form knots which are hard to unravel, where in the dawn of the future there were many things that he could do no more than conjecture, Spranger would attack them with a whole precise System set up by the clear and factual thinking which he had learned in the school of the neo-Kantians. He was able to separate the entangled threads, to
cut, as it were, swathes through the thicket, sometimes perhaps with a certain ruthlessness; but in that way he created a clearer picture of the whole on which one could begin to build. And that is how he created the psychology of the humane sciences.

The significance of the "Lebensformen" is not apparent if we see in it nothing but a typology such as that era produced in abundance. The decisive element in it is the connection between the individual human spirit and objective culture, a combination which is the systematic starting point of that typology. It is not simply a co-ordination of the human spirit with culture in general, such as for example lies at the base of the Platonic Theory of State, for, in Spranger's view, the human spirit (soul) is not simply developed from within but only as it were by grafting itself onto the inter-weaving meanings of the various branches of culture, while these in their turn are realized in the mind of the developing human being. Here then are the systematic foundations for the deeper roots of the pedagogy which Spranger created in close intercourse with Nohl and Litt, and which has been designated with the restrictive and yet apt title of "Kulturpädagogik" ("Cultural Pedagogy"). The title -"Kultur und Erziehung" ("Culture and Education") - of the volume in which Spranger from 1919 onwards collected his educational articles in various editions with increasing (and sometimes changing) content, indicates in a short formula the influence of these factors on each other. And here indeed we find indicated the constant thread of thought which from that date onwards held together the almost unsurveyable number of his pedagogic works, and which still retains its stimulating freshness.

It is just as obvious however that the "Lebensformen" implicitly contain a whole cultural philosophy which only needed to be extracted from it independently (as Spranger himself often did in his own lectures). On the other hand the book forms the starting-point for his later numerous and far-reaching cultural-philosophic and politico-cultural works.

The "Psychologie des Jugendalters" which followed immediately, is the necessary Supplement to the first book; for it is here that the application of the psychology of the humane sciences to the individual human being is first developed and becomes viable. Whatever may have been said later - and not without some justification -about the historically determined one-sidedness of the work, cannot detract from its undoubted merits, merits which enabled a whole generation of teachers throughout several decades to view young people in its light and educate them accordingly. Not only that, it enabled a whole youthful generation to discover in the book its own image and to a great extent mould itself according to that image.

And so these two mutually supplementary books present the cultural foundations of an educational system and the image of the youthful generation to be - and willing to be - educated. The form which was assumed by the secondary schools in the twenties was definitely determined by these books — both from above, through the reform of the schools administration and from below through the numerous teachers who had directly or indirectly passed through the Spranger school by way of his lectures or his books. This also applies to the primary schools which Spranger influenced decisively through his participation in the Becker Academies.

If we glance at the list of Spranger's other writings we cannot fail to note that with these two books the series of major independent works is concluded. Those that follow, apart from many single articles, treatises, and lectures on various occasions, are represented only by collections of essays, such as the new enlarged editions of "Kultur und Erziehung" ("Culture and Education"), then "Volk, Staat und Erziehung" ("Nation, State and Education") (first pub-
lished in 1932) in which increased political interest is brought to light, then
"Goethes Weltanschauung" ("Goethe's Ideology") (1943); after the war "Pädagogische Perspektiven" ("Pedagogic Perspectives") (1941), and "Kulturfragen der Gegenwart" ("Present-Day Cultural Problems") (1953) to which was later added a new type of lesser works to be discussed below.

Setting aside the influences of external conditions such as the difficulties of the Hitler period, the tasks imposed by his stay in Japan, the burdens created by the second World War, this change of style in Spranger's academic work has other, deeper roots. After the broadly sketched, rationally constructive ideas produced in the early years which, in much simplified form, had set up the basic scheme of a pedagogic System, the need for using his rich experience and his results for penetrating more deeply into the relevant individual branches of knowledge becomes increasingly perceptible. Out of the abstraction of the early period there gradually emerged the experience-saturated form characteristic of Spranger in his middle and late periods.

The result of all this work is mainly to be found in his great Academy treatises. I shall only mention here the most important from the systematic point of view: "Die Frage nach der Einheit der Psychologie" ("Inquiry into the Unity of Psychology") (1926), "Die Kulturzyklen-Theorie und das Problem des Kulturzerfalls" ("The Theory of Cultural Cycles and the Problem of Cultural Decay") (1926), "Der Sinn der Voraussetzungslosigkeit in den Geisteswissenschaften" ("The Meaning of an Unconditioned Attitude in the Humane Sciences") (1929), "Die Urschichten des Wirklichkeitsbewußtseins" ("The Primary Levels of Consciousness of Reality") (1934), "Probleme der Kulturmorphologie" ("Problems of Cultural Morphology"), etc.

It seems however to be a general rule in cultural history that the first works with which a successful author has made a brilliant name for himself impress the image of his personality so firmly on his public that his later works become overshadowed. Thus Goethe was still known as the author of "Werther" long after he had written the "Wahlverwandtschaften." In the same way Spranger's image was determined by the "Lebensformen" and the "Psychologie des Jugendalters" and remained the same even when he himself by means of newer studies had entered into an entirely different mode of thought. The older works appeared everywhere in numerous editions and were enthusiastically received by a whole generation of educationalists. It is true that the newer books were also fairly widely read, but far less than the two major works; above all however these newer works were only evaluated as Supplements to and explanations of individual problems, no attention being paid to the new forms of thought which were expressed therein. The scientific yield of the individual studies produced in Spranger's "middle period" (as I will shortly call it), remained un-noticed and there is an urgent need for it to be very carefully investigated today. Spranger's intellectual image will not only be enriched by such investigation but also corrected in certain essential points.

If this picture of "Spranger in his middle period" roughly corresponds to the years of his activities as a teacher in Berlin, it should be noted that a distinct change took place — certainly caused by the bitter experiences of the last war — during the period which I should like to designate as that of the "mature Spranger." This may be Said to have begun with his lecture on "Weltfrömmigkeit" ("Piety in the World"), 1941, which was later incorporated in his book "Die Magie der Seele" ("The Magic of the Soul"), 1947, and supplemented by his article "Der unbekannte Gott" ("The Unknown God") 1951 and 1954. In a way which in general we may connect with his advanced age, the world itself has receded into the back-ground, becoming
transparent and allowing glimpses of hitherto unexperienced metaphysical depths.

From the educational point of view this in its turn caused him to revert to elementary principles in education and to an overriding preoccupation with the aims to be achieved in primary schools. This is observable to a marked degree in his last minor studies, "Der Eigengeist der Volksschule" ("The Special Nature of the Primary School"), 1955, "Der geborene Erzieher" ("The Born Educator"), 1958, "Das Gesetz der ungewollten Nebenwirkungen in der Erziehung" ("The Law of Involuntary Side-Effects in Education"), 1962. On the occasion of Spranger's eightieth birthday I attempted a small sketch of the Special features of these works of his old age.

The series was completed in a short article "Vom metaphysischen Leid" ("Of Metaphysical Suffering"), 1963, in which Spranger courageously attempts to accept with resignation and to interpret as a kind of sublime "nostalgia" the last painful experiences of life caused by the death of some beloved person. "It is not possible to suppress genuine nostalgia. Nor would it be right to do so. Because: in nostalgia there is something of nobility, something of sublime origin illuminating and ennobling the soul of man."

Spranger's last piece of work was his obituary for Theodor Litt. It ends with the words that might have been written as his own epitaph: "May Germany never lack such upright educators of academic youth — a minimum of sentimentality, crystal clear logic, ethical from beginning to end. Anyone who has had the privilege of being this man's friend will now turn his face away that no one see the tears in his eyes."

And here we must add another passage from Spranger's works. In 1962 he added to the new edition of his "Philosoph von Sanssouci" the picture showing the King on his return from the Seven Years' War listening to the Te Deum he had commissioned. In explanation he cites Kugler's report: "The King had entered the Chapel unaccompanied, had seated himself and given the signal to start. As the singers began the hymn of praise, he rested his head on his hands and wept." This picture and the words of explanation were very carefully selected. We may assume that Spranger was seeing himself in that image, all the more as he expressly adds the words: "the conviction that in old age one should acknowledge what one owes to those teachers from whom one has learned what life demands."

To the best of my knowledge this is the only direct self-revelation (pronounced when he was already very near to death), ever given by this reserved man: "to learn what life demands," i.e. to look on life as a service which one must perform — to do one's duty to the last ounce of strength, overshadowed by suffering, and "ethical from beginning to end."

And that describes Spranger himself as he remained to the last moment of his life. Compared with that, how petty the usual picture seems of a quiet and peaceful old age. Anyone who met him in the last months of his life saw him as follows: perhaps a shade stiffer but still upright in his carriage, no hint of carelessness, as ever careful to observe all forms of courtesy, slightly ceremonious, and always thinking first of the other person and how he could be of assistance to him. It was a very touching picture, as a photograph of him taken a few days before his last illness shows him in all his quiet dignity. But he was tired. He even said himself that he no longer felt that he quite belonged to this world. He had the feeling that he had done his duty for long enough and could now seek release.

But what does that mean for us? To recall his image would be irresponsible if we were only to succumb to our grief and not to ask ourselves what duties arise for us through Spranger's death. For us his death is a challenge. Seriously considered, this problem is not easy to solve.
It would be making it too easy for ourselves to assume we could solve it simply by making up our minds to carry on his work.

True, much of his work can be continued and it must be done all the more consciously as it does not lie along the lines of prominent present-day trends. The essential kernel of the humane sciences has still not been sufficiently revealed and its place within the frame-work of present-day culture and society is not yet fully understood. Above all we shall have to return to Spranger's work in his middle period. Over and above this, the pedagogic-cultural foundation laid down by him will by now have been absorbed into the timeless content of general educational science. All this must be very care-fully considered.

Nevertheless we must not forget the first realization that came to us with the shock of his death, that with him there died a world which he still represented, which in him came alive for us and which now no longer exists.

That makes our task more difficult. In many respects there are no longer any direct links with that world. Our attitude to idealism and classical humanism is necessarily different. We shall have to make Special efforts to repossess a great deal that for him was present and a matter of course. Even neo-Kantianism is farther removed from us today. It will not be until, by dint of critical studies, we are able to view Spranger in perspective that his image will appear in its full majesty — the image of a great humanity, moulded, down to the last detail, by ethical considerations. And thus Spranger becomes, as he himself expressed it in the title of one of his articles: a teacher of humanity.

When we look on this image, this picture of a great man, and ask ourselves what is the obligation that it lays on us—when we consider this as seriously as possible, I know no other answer than one which may perhaps sound arrogant and is yet meant quite seriously and modest: to become like him, not naturally in his achievement, but in his humanity.